Mar 24 2009

Wall Street watchdog in jail

When the U.S. Government sent Eugene V. Debs to prison in 1918 for distributing antiwar pamphlets in violation of the Espionage and Sedition Act of 1917, the industrial barons breathed a sigh of relief. In the first two decades of the 20th century, big business detested Debs, the five-time Presidential candidate of the Socialist Party, champion of workers’ rights, and general trouble-maker for industry. He was sentenced to a ten-year prison term, but President Harding let him out in 1920. His arrest was clearly political.

Today, sitting in an Arizona jail cell is a man who during the 80’s and 90’s was detested by the new industrial barons of the 21st century – the CEOs of high tech corporations and financial security firms and giant accounting and insurance companies, especially the ones accused of securities fraud. They hated and feared his resourcefulness, his tenacity, and his gift for seeing through the veneer of false quarterly statements. As a lawyer, he was not intimidated by their power, and he amassed a personal fortune by winning settlements against large corporations engaged in securities fraud.

During the Clinton Administration, he warned Congress and the President of a rising tide of financial fraud and pleaded with Congress not to shut the court house doors to average investors, not to loosen regulations on derivatives and other shaky instruments, and not to reduce the funds for the Security and Exchange Commission. Republicans and some high level Democrats with ties to the financial industry, like Senators Chris Dodd and Harry Reid, and then Congressman Charles Schumer, ignored and even ridiculed his admonishments.

The louder he spoke, and the more lawsuits he filed against companies, the more enemies he made in high places. He had a target on his back, drawn by the business elite, who were pressuring the government to investigate their tormentor. Shortly after George Bush became President, word leaked out that the federal government was indeed pursuing a case against him.

Six years later, in the fall of 2007, the United States government charged San Diego lawyer Bill Lerach and other members of his firm with deceiving the courts about whether they paid people to be their plaintiffs. Lerach pled guilty.

Lerach was wrong to break the rules on paying plaintiffs and even more wrong not to admit it right away. Lerach was a victim of his enormous ego and an insatiable appetite for all that life can offer. He was not going to let something he perceived as trivial, such as the prohibition on paying plaintiffs, limit his ability to make money or cause mayhem in corporate boardrooms. He felt he could not wait for plaintiffs to come to him. When he saw fraud, he wanted to file a case.

From 1991 to 1997, I conducted opinion research, helped prepare Congressional testimony and handled some public relations for the National Association of Securities Lawyers, which included Lerach. I worked directly with him a number of times, and each time I came away impressed by his brain and his ability to focus but worried about his total lack of self-doubt and his constant hunger for more, more , more, of whatever interested him at the time. It is not hard to believe he would have gone too far.

I believe it is important, however, to separate the person from the product of his labors. While Lerach’s motives may have been monetary, his impact was immensely salutary for society. You cannot say that about the people who wanted him to go away.

In an era of government deregulation and non-enforcement, he became practically the only entity that made swindlers think twice. The records show he won over $10 billion in claims for millions of investors who believed they were defrauded by financial swindlers. In nearly every case, the fraud defendants insisted on sealing the records, closed to public scrutiny. Then they would stand on the courthouse steps and intone how they have paid ransom money to Bill Lerach in a frivolous lawsuit, just to make the suit go away. The way it works when you are at the top is: hide the facts, pay huge settlements, which corporate insurance covers, and then denounce the suits as meritless.

Lerach was a leading watchdog in hundreds of cases, helping to uncover the Savings & Loan scandals of the ’80s, as well as the Enron and Worldcom debacles. Corporate wrong-doers everywhere celebrated when he was convicted in February 2008 and sentenced to two years in prison.

There is no excuse for Lerach breaking the law. But we should also recognize that the laws, the regulations, the court procedures, even the press coverage are all stacked in favor of the powerful. Every day Lerach was on the prowl evened the odds a little bit for the rest of us.

I realize Lerach is no martyr, like Eugene v. Debs. He is an aggressive lawyer who sought fortune and fame. You will not see his name on Amnesty International’s list of political prisoners. But when you consider the wide discretion prosecutors have in terms of whom to spend their resources investigating, you might conclude that Lerach’s imprisonment is a political act by our government.

President Obama could make a political statement of his own if he pardoned Lerach. It would send Wall Street a message louder than the day’s opening bell – the junk yard dog may soon be back at the gate, so watch your step.


Jan 29 2009

Obama's challenge: sorry record of Democratic deregulators

President Obama’s pledge to bring back some meaningful regulation of the financial markets may be more difficult than he imagines. The reason: Senate Democratic leaders not only enabled the deregulation, they were cheerleaders.

In America, unlike other nations, the structure of investor protections against securities fraud stands on two separate legs: Government regulators and private lawsuits. Senator Chris Dodd, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, and other Democrats, worked diligently to saw off both legs.

Here is how the people’s representatives took the side of fraud defendants over the fraud victims.

STEP ONE: CURTAIL PRIVATE INVESTOR LAWSUITS

When in the mid 1990’s Dodd and fellow Democrats Charles Schumer, Patty Murray, and Harry Reid worked to curtail private lawsuits by investors who were victims of securities fraud, they weakened what has traditionally been the most effective deterrent to securities fraud.

Their actions represent the result of a determined effort by giant corporations seeking to do away with accountability in the financial markets because they felt it got in the way of their profits. In 1992 these companies spent millions of dollars on lobbying to get Congress to enact a law to shield them from private lawsuits. (Siconolfi, Michael, and Anita Raghavan. “Securities Firms Make Large Gifts to Congressmen.” Wall Street Journal 22 Aug. 1995: C1+.)

The Coalition to End Abusive Securities Suits, or CEASS as it was known, included some large accounting firms caught in fraud scandals of the 1980’s and 90’s, such as Arthur Anderson, Coopers and Lybrand, Ernst and Young, Deloitte Touché. Other CEASS members included securities firms and insurance companies, such as Prudential Securities, Chubb insurance, Morgan Stanley, and Amdahl corp. It was the beginning of a massive, costly, and successful lobbying effort.

The CEASS lobby in the early 1990’s pushed hard for Congress to approve a new law that would make it more difficult for people to bring class action lawsuits in federal courts against companies allegedly involved in securities fraud. The legislation was called the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), and it changed the rules to require that investors prove intentional lying by company executives in order to get into court. This standard is so high that investors now practically need to have an executive make a videotape and say he lied before investors can challenge suspicious behavior.

Making these lawsuits harder to bring to court diminishes the main deterrent to securities fraud in the U.S., since federal and state government regulators are notoriously understaffed. Most of the big cases, such as the billion dollar scandal of Charles Keating’s Lincoln Savings and Loan selling worthless bonds to elderly retirees in the late 1980’s, were uncovered by private lawsuits which then led to SEC investigations. Under the new standards in the PSLRA of 1995, the Keating fraud and others like it would not have been uncovered. We now know the sleepy state of federal watchdogs is one reason why Bernie Madoff was able to operate for decades without getting caught.

Two members of Congress championed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, and took credit for its enactment over President Clinton’s veto:

Republican Christopher Cox, then a Congressman from Orange County, California. Cox collected campaign contributions from high tech executives who also happened to be fraud defendants.

Democratic Senator Chris Dodd, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, who became very popular among banks and securities companies who were fraud defendants and among insurance companies who pay the investor settlements in financial fraud cases.

Dodd enjoyed the eager support of many top Democrats in favor of restricting investors’ access to the courts.

Not everyone thought this was a keen idea, however. Consumer groups, states attorneys general who enforce the securities laws, the AARP, and the securities regulators in all 50 states sent messages to Cox and Dodd that the bill was a bad idea that would weaken safeguards against fraud. (”Less protection for investors.” Consumer Reports Sept. 1995.)

Rick Roberts, a former Securities and Exchange Commissioner under the first President Bush, warned in September 1995, “if you look at the whole picture, congress is taking away the right to bring an action if there is a fraud; it’s cutting the level of information investors receive; and third it will try to slash the SEC budget so there are no public remedies. If I was an investor, I would be getting very queasy about plugging my money into the securities market.”

STEP TWO: LETTING THE FOX GUARD THE HENHOUSE AT SEC

In 2004, President Bush appointed Chris Cox to be Chairman of the SEC and the Senate, with the approval of Dodd and the other Democrats, voted unanimously to confirm Cox. In so doing, Dodd and the Democrats agreed to place the protection of investors in the hands of a man who had already made it his cause to shred the most potent deterrent to securities fraud.

As chairman, Cox allowed securities firms to avoid legal requirements to be audited by accounting firms that were registered with the government. The result was that firms like Bernie Madoff’s used their own accountants to do friendly audits and fraud can remain undetected for years. Also, under Cox, the SEC’s budget declined in 2006, and 07.

Why bring up all of this recent history? Because when Sens. Dodd and Schumer cried out this week about how the SEC “missed Madoff,” it is hard to remain silent.

President Obama and Treasury Secretary Geithner should know the sorry record of the Congressional team it has inherited, before they suit up to pitch for stronger protections for investors. And voters should know when their Senators talk like Teddy Roosevelt and act like Jay Gould.